Introduction
We take most of our decisions without knowing for sure their consequences: the outcome of each decision depends on the realization of some uncertain event.
To help an individual facing a decision problem under uncertainty, the axiomatic approach that we adopt in this chapter takes the following steps. 1) Assume that the decision maker has well de…ned preferences; 2) Propose a set of "rationality" axioms that are su¢ciently intuitive; 3) Derive from these axioms a representation of the decision maker's preferences; 4) Evaluate all possible decisions with this representation and take the one that score best.
Importantly, if the decision maker agrees with the set of axioms, he will also agrees with the model derived from these axioms. This model will then help him to take the right decisions.
In this chapter, we deal with a speci…c uncertain environment, known as "risk", in which the probability of each event is known. In this setting, we de…ne the main properties of decision under risk, the di¤erent possible behavior under risk and their comparison. We study next the standard model of behavior under risk, the expected utility model. We provide axiomatic foundation, study the properties of the model and its behavioral implications. We then discuss the problems raised by this expected utility model, which cannot account for observed behavior. We then expose a few alternative models, although the main generalization of the expected utility model, in which decisions are evaluated by Choquet integrals will be presented in chapter 3.
Decision under uncertainty
A decision problem under uncertainty is usually described through a set S called the set of states of nature (or states of the world), identifying events with subsets of S.
We will only need to use the sub-family of "relevant" events for the problem at hand and will then use the smallest ¾-algebra A including this sub-family.
Denote C a set of possible outcomes or consequences, and G an algebra containing the singletons of C. A decision, or act is de…ned as a measurable mapping from (S; A) to (C, G):
Denote X the set of all such mappings from S to consequences C. We assume that a decision maker has a well de…ned weak preference relation % on X: Strict preference is denoted Â and indi¤erence is denoted ». The preference relation on X induces (through constant acts) a preference relation on the set C of consequences. Abusing notation, we also denote this preference relation % on C.
We aim at representing the decision maker's preferences (X; %) by a real valued utility function, that is, a mapping V from X to R such that:
This functional will take di¤erent forms depending on the set of axioms one imposes.
Risk vs uncertainty
One can distinguish di¤erent forms of uncertainty according to the information the decision maker has on the states of nature.
The two extreme situations are (i) risk, in which there exists a unique probability distribution P on (S; A), and this distribution is objectively known; (ii) total ignorance, in which no information whatsoever is available on the events 1 .
In between these two extreme cases, one can distinguish among di¤erent situations depending on how much information one has on the probability of the various events.
In this chapter, we assume that the decision maker is in a situation of risk. He knows the probability distribution P , which is exogenous, on the set of states of natures:
The set (S; A) endowed with this probability measure is thus a probability space (S; A; P ):
Since each decision X induces a probability distribution P X on (C, G), and under the rather natural assumption that two decisions with the same probability distribution are equivalent, the preference relation % on X, induces a preference relation, denoted % with a slight abuse of notation, de…ned on the set of probability distributions with support in C.
We furthermore identify consequence c of C with the Dirac measure ± c in L and will indi¤erently use the notation ± c % P X or c % P X or c % X .
We therefore work on the set L of probability distributions on (C,G) endowed with the relation %. The decision maker must therefore compare probability distributions.
Let L 0 ½ L be the set of probability distributions with …nite support in C; in this case, the probability distribution of decision X is denoted P X = (x 1 ; p 1 ; :::; x n ; p n ) where x 1 -::: -x n , p i¸0 and P i p i = 1. Such distributions with …nite supports are called lotteries.
In the following section, we give intrinsic de…nitions (that is, independent from representation models) of measures of risk and risk aversion. 1 The distinction between risk and uncertainty is due to Knight (1921) . 4 
Risk and increasing risk: comparison and measures
In this section, we take X to be the set of A¡ measurable functions 2 that are real valued and bounded, from (S; A) to (R; B), that is, the set of real, bounded, random variables.
Notation and de…nitions
A decision in X is thus a random variable X, whose probability distribution P X , de…ned by: for all B ½ R, P X (B) = P fs 2 S j X(s) 2 Bg. We will restrict our attention to bounded random variables. P X has a cumulative distribution function F X (x) = P(fs 2 S : X(s) · xg). Its expected value or mean is denoted E(X). De…ne the function G X (x) = P(fs 2 S : X (s) > xg) = 1 ¡ F X (x) to be the survival function.
We are now about to give de…nitions for the comparison of various probability distributions. The preference relations so de…ned will be partial. They are sometimes called stochastic orders.
First order stochastic dominance
We can make a few remarks concerning this de…nition.
² If X FSD Y , the graph of Y is above the graph of X.
² This condition can be expressed through survival functions.
(P rfX > xg)¸(P rfY > xg) : for all x, the probability of having more than x is always larger for X than for Y .
² This notion implies that E(X)¸E(Y ):
² The relation FSD ranks only partially the elements of L.
Let X and Y be two acts whose consequences are described in each state of nature s 2 S in the following table: 
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The cumulative distribution functions of X and Y are respectively:
It is easily seen that for all x in R, F X (x) · F Y (x) and hence X FSD Y:
We can now give a characterization of this notion:
and only if for all increasing functions u from R to R,
Second order stochastic dominance
One can also compare probability distributions according to their "risks": there exist several possible de…nitions of what it means for a distribution to be more risky than another one. For each of these notions, there is an associated notion of risk aversion and these di¤erent de…nitions are independent of the decision model that is retained.
The usual notion of increasing risk is the one associated with second order stochastic dominance, denoted SSD, introduced in economics by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) .
We have the following implication:
The converse is false.
The relation SSD also ranks partially only the elements of L. When X and Y have the same mean, we have the following de…nition:
One also says that Y is more risky with the same mean than X .
Example 1 Let X and Z be two acts whose decisions in each state of nature s 2 S are reported in the following Computing the cumulative distribution functions of X and Z respectively, we get:
One can check that E(X) = E(Y ) and that the surface between 0 and T of the di¤erence between F Z (x) and F X (x) is always positive which implies that X DS2 Z and hence Z MPS X:
The following proposition makes the de…nition of MPS more intuitive: (ii) Y has the same distribution as (X + µ) where µ is a random variable such that E(µjX) = 0 almost everywhere.
(iii) For all increasing and concave u from R ! R,
The characterization (ii) reveals the intuition behind the de…nition since it expresses the fact that Y is a mean preserving spread of X when Y can be obtained by adding to X some "noise ". After we de…ne an expected utility decision maker (section 3), we will interpret condition (iii) behaviorally.
Remark 1 Several other notions of increasing risk can be de…ned, that we will not develop here although they are sometimes more suited for particular comparative static problems. 3 . some of these notions will be developed in chapter 3.
Remark 2 If Y MPS X, then the variance of Y is greater than or equal to that of X. The converse is not always true (see section 3.3.3). The variance could be intuitively used as a measure of increases in risk but we'll see in section 3.3.3 that it might lead to inconsistencies.
Behavior under risk 2.2.1 Model-free behavioral de…nitions
For a decision maker with a preference relation % on X; we de…ne some typical behavior under risk.
Let us …rst recall that comparing E(X) and X amounts to compare ± E(X) and X:
Risk aversion We can de…ne various notions of risk aversion. We will concentrate on two of them in this chapter.
De…nition 4 (Arrow (1965)-Pratt (1964)) An agent is weakly risk averse if for any random variable X in X, he prefers its expected valueto the random variable itself:
He is weekly risk seeking if
This de…nition usually is not enough to rank two distributions with the same mean. One can also use another de…nition:
De…nition 5 a decision maker is strongly risk averse if for any couple of random variables X; Y in X with the same expected valueand such that Y is more risky than X according to second order stochastic dominance, he prefers the less risky variable X to Y :
If a decision maker does not always rank couple of random variables (Y MPS X) in the same way, he will not …t into any of these categories.
Remark 3
It is easy to see that for all X, X MPS E(X) (that is, X is a mean preserving spread of E(X)); hence, a strongly risk averse decision maker will necessarily be weakly risk averse. The converse does not hold in general.
Certainty equivalent, risk premium and behavior compari-
son.
Certainty equivalent For each random variable X in X, its certainty equivalent, if it exists, is the certain outcome c X in C that is indi¤erent to X : c X » X . In this chapter, any random variable in X has a unique certainty equivalent.
Risk premium The risk premium attached to X is denoted ½ X . It is the di¤erence between the expected valueof X and its certainty equivalent:
This premium can be interpreted as the maximum amount the decision maker is willing to pay to exchange the variable X against its mean. This premium is negative whenever the decision maker is weakly risk seeking.
The risk premium captures the intensity of (weak) aversion to risk. It is possible to use it to compare, in a partial manner, di¤erent behaviors.
De…nition 6 A decision maker 1 is more weakly risk averse than a decision maker 2 if for all X 2 X, the risk premium ½ 1 X of decision maker 1 is greater than or equal to the risk premium ½ 2 X of decision maker 2.
The expected utility (EU) model of von NeumannMorgenstern
We now come back to the decision problem faced by a decision maker endowed with a preference relation % on X and the associated relation on L.
We now expose the axiomatic foundation of the classical model of decision under risk: the expected utility (EU) model due to von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) (1947). We study how notions of risk aversion de…ned above translate in this model.
We consider here the set L of probability distributions on (C, G) where C is a set endowed with an algebra G which contains by assumption all the singletons.
Before giving the axioms, we …rst need to de…ne a mixture operation on the set of probability distributions.
Mixing probability distributions For all P; Q 2 L and ® 2 [0; 1], we call ®-mixture of P and Q, the distribution R = ®P + (1 ¡ ®)Q, such that, for all A in A, R(A) = ®P(A) + (1 ¡ ®)Q(A). The mixture of two distributions can be interpreted, when P and Q are discrete, as a two-stage lottery: in the …rst stage, the distributions P and Q are drawn with probability ® and (1 ¡ ®) respectively, while in the second stage, a consequence is chosen according to the distribution drawn in the …rst stage.
L is then a convex subset of a vector space.
Generalized mixture For any ® 1 ; :::; ® n 2 [0; 1] ; such that P ® i = 1 and for all P 1 ; :::; P n 2 L, one can de…ne in a similar way the mixture of these n distributions P i , as the distribution R = P ® i P i such that for all A 2 G;
Any distribution with …nite support can thus be written as a mixture of
This can also be referred to as a "convex combination of consequences".
Axiomatic foundation of the EU model
The model is based on three fundamental axioms: a weak order axiom, a continuity axiom and an independence axiom, to which an extra axiom is added in certain cases. One can …nd intuitive presentations of the axioms as well as elegant proofs of the vNM theorem (both in the …nite and in…nite case) for instance in Herstein-Milnor (1957) , Ja¤ray (1978 Ja¤ray ( , 2000 , Jensen (1967) , Fishburn (1970 Fishburn ( , 1982 , Kreps (1988) .
We follow here the presentation of J.Y. Ja¤ray (1978 Ja¤ray ( , 2000 .
Axiom 1 : Weak Order
The preference relation % on L; is a complete weak order that is non trivial.
The relation % is thus re ‡exive, transitive and complete, and furthermore, there exists at least one couple P; Q in L such that P Â Q:
The completeness assumption, i.e., the fact that the decision maker is assumed to be able to rank all alternatives, is rather strong in some context. It is nevertheless widely accepted in standard economic models.
Adding the continuity axiom to this Weak Order axiom allows the relation % to be represented by a functional often called utility function V : X ! R, such that :
The precise formulation of the continuity axiom depends on the topological structure of X, on which preferences are de…ned (see Debreu 1954 , Grandmont 1972 .
When this set is a set of probability distributions, as it is the case here, the continuity axiom can be expressed as follows : This axiom requires that there does not exist a consequence c M that is so desirable (actually in…nitely desirable) that if a distribution P 0 o¤ered this consequence with the smallest (positive) probability, this distribution would be preferred to any other distribution that would not have c M as a possible consequence. This axiom also prevents the existence of an in…nitely undesirable consequence c m (one can think of c M as being paradise and c m as being hell, as in Pascal's bet).
The independence axiom that we now give is central in the construction of the expected utility model. 
This axiom can be interpreted as follows (building on the interpretation of the mixture we gave above). A decision maker that prefers P to Q and who has to choose between the two mixtures ®P +(1¡®)R and ®Q+(1¡®)R would reason in the following manner. If an event of probability (1 ¡ ®) occurs, he gets the distribution R independently of his choice, whereas if the complement event occurs, he faces the choice between P and Q. Since he prefers P , he will prefer the mixture ®P + (1 ¡ ®)R. The logic behind this axiom seems therefore rather intuitive. 4 However, this axiom has concentrated on itself a lot of criticism: numerous experimental studies (such as the Allais paradox) have shown that most decision makers take decisions that contradict this axiom. We will come back on this issue in section 4.1.
The representation theorem can be decomposed into two important results:
Linear utility theorem
Theorem 1 Let (L, %) be a convex subset of a vector space on R endowed with a preference relation % : The following two conditions are equivalent: (i) (L, %) satisfy Weak order, continuity and independence.
(ii) There exists a linear function U from L to R that represents the weak order, that is,
Proof 1 We only give a sketch of the proof. It consists in proving the following points:
(1) For all P , Q in L and
(4) For all P 1 , P 2 in L such that P 1 Â P 2 , there exists a linear utility function on the set L 12 de…ned by: L 12 = fP 2 L; P 1 % P % P 2 g ; (5) This linear utility on L 12 is unique up to a positive a¢ne transformation; (6) Extrapolating; there exists a linear utility function on (L; %) which is unique up to a positive a¢ne transformation.
This theorem is true as soon as L is a convex subset of a vector space. In order to be able to express the functional U as an expected utility, it is necessary to explore several cases according to the structure of C.
² When the distributions do not have …nite support, the algebra G must be rich enough and, furthermore, one need to add a dominance axiom.
² When C is already ordered (by a complete weak order) -in particular when C is a subset of R, it is necessary to impose a stronger axiom (sometimes labeled monotonicity axiom) that ensures the compatibility of the preference relation on X and the preference relation on C.
vNM theorem for distributions with …nite support in (C,G)
We restrict our attention to the set L 0 of distributions with …nite support over C. Any distribution P can then be written P = (x 1 ; p 1 ; :::; x n ; p n ) (i.e., P yields consequence x i with probability p i and
(L 0 , %) is a convex set and the previous axioms are su¢cient for the representation theorem of % as an expected utility.
Theorem 2 Let L 0 be the set of distributions with …nite support in C endowed with the preference relation %. The following two statements are equivalent:
(i) (L 0 ; %) satis…es Weak order, continuity and independence.
(ii) There exists a utility function U representing the relation % such that
where u is a strictly increasing function from C to R de…ned by u(x) = U(± x ) and unique up to a positive a¢ne transformation.
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One understands easily in this formulation why the expected utility model is said to be linear: it deals with probabilities in a linear way, since U (®P+(1¡ ®)Q) = ®U (P ) + (1 ¡ ®)U(Q).
vNM theorem for distributions with bounded suport in (C,G)
This theorem can be generalized to the set L of probability distributions on (C,G):
We …rst assume that 8c 2 C, the sets {c 0 2 C; c 0 -c} and {c 0 2 C; c 0 % c} belong to the algebra G. We furthermore impose the following dominance axiom, which will guarantee that the utility function u is bounded and therefore that R C udP is well de…ned.
This axiom expresses the fact that if all the outcomes of the distribution P are preferred to the outcome c 0 , then P is preferred to the degenerate distribution on c 0 .
For a distribution P with bounded support in (C,G), de…ne its cumulative distribution function F as follows: F is a mapping from C to [0; 1] de…ned by F (x) = PfX -xg. One can then state vNM theorem in this setting:
Theorem 3 Let L be the set of probability distributions with bounded support in (C,G) endowed with the preference relation %. The following two statements are equivalent:
(i) (L; %) satis…es Weak order, continuity, independence and dominance.
(ii) There exists a utility function U representing the relation % with
where u is a strictly increasing , bounded mapping from C to R de…ned by u(x) = U(± x ), unique up to a positive a¢ne transformation.
Remark 4
In the remainder, a decision maker who obeys to the axioms of the vNM model will be called an EU decision maker.
Remark 5
The behavior of an EU decision maker is entirely characterized by the function u.
vNM theorem for distributions with bounded support in (R; B)
When C is a subset of R, axioms 1, 2, 3, even combined with axiom 4 are not su¢cient to obtain the representation. One needs to express the compatibility between the preference relation % and the order relation¸that exists on R; one then need to replace axiom 4 by a stronger axiom:
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Axiom 5 Monotonicity :
For all x; y in R, x¸y () x % y
One can the state the theorem in this setting:
Theorem 4 Let L be the set of probability distributions with bounded support in R endowed with the preference relation %. The following two statements are equivalent: (i) (L; %) satis…es Weak order, continuity, independence and monotonicity .
where u is a strictly increasing function from R to R de…ned by u(x) = U (± x ), which is unique up to a positive a¢ne transformation.
Characterization of risk aversion in the EU model
In the remainder of section 3, we consider the set X of random variables with bounded support in (R; B) and the associated set of distributions with bounded support in (R; B): How are the two notions of risk aversion that we introduced characterized in the EU model?
The following proposition shows that they cannot be distinguished in this model.
Proposition 3 (Rothschild and
Stiglitz) The following three assertions are equivalent for an expected utility decision maker:
(i) The decision maker is weakly risk averse.
(ii) The decision maker is strongly risk averse.
(iii) The decision maker utility function u is concave. 6 Remark 6 Proposition 3 thus reveals that a EU decision maker cannot make a distinction between weak and strong risk aversion. In the EU model, one can simply speak of risk aversion without ambiguity.
Characterization of …rst and second order dominance in the EU model
One can now interpret propositions 2 and 3 (iii) of the previous section, in the EU model:
² Proposition 2 : X …rst order stochastically dominates Y if and only if any EU decision maker preferes X to Y.
² Proposition 3 (iii) : a random Y is a mean preserving spread of X if and only if E(X) = E(Y ) and any weakly risk averse EU decision maker prefers X to Y .
Coe¢cient of absolute risk aversion, local value of the risk premium
In the EU model, it is possible to de…ne the intensity of risk aversion for a decision maker, through properties of u.
Coe¢cient of absolute risk aversion
De…nition 7 When the function u; which characterized the behavior of an EU decision maker is strictly increasing, twice continuously di¤erentiable with strictly positive derivative, we call the coe¢cient of absolute risk aversion the function R A from R to R de…ned by
Note that this coe¢cient is independent from the choice of the function u representing the preferences. Any other function v = au + b; a > 0 will have the same coe¢cient.
Local value of the risk premium
When the distribution X with an expected value x anda variance ¾ 2 , takes its values in an interval [x ¡ h; x + h] where h is "small" with respect to x, one can show (Arrow, 1965 and Pratt, 1964 ) that the risk premium is proportional to the coe¢cient of absolute risk aversion :
This approximation is useful as it serves to distinguish in the expression of the risk premium an objective part which depends solely on the variance of the distribution from a subjective part that is linked to the decision maker's preferences, R A (x).
This result can be used to show the following theorem that compares the behavior of two EU decision makers:
Theorem 5 (Arrow, 1965 and Pratt, 1964 ) Let 1 and 2 be two EU decision makers, with utility functions u 1 and u 2 respectively, that are assumed to be strictly increasing and twice continuously di¤erentiable. The following assertions are equivalent:
(i) 1 is more risk averse than 2: ½ 1 X¸½ 2 X . (ii) There exists an increasing and concave function ' from R to R such that u 1 = '(u 2 ).
(iii) The coe¢cient of absolute risk aversion for u 1 est is greater than or equal to the coe¢cient of absolute risk aversion for u 2 for all x 2 R :
Remark 7 The notions of risk premium and coe¢cient of absolute risk aversion can also be de…ned for decision makers that are not necessarily risk averse. The theorem can be applied to compare such decision makers.
Remark 8
The equivalence between (i) and (ii) remains true even when u 1 and u 2 are not twice continuously di¤erentiable.
Variance and EU model
We saw in remark 6 that the notion of an increase in rsik in the sense of second order stochastic dominance had a nice justi…cation in the EU model. The variance is not a good indicator of riskiness as the follwong example, due to Ingersoll (1987) shows.
Consider two lotteries P = (0; 1=2; 4; 1=2) and Q = (1; 7=8; 9; 1=8): One has E(P) = E(Q) and V ar(Q) > V ar(P ). Take a decision maker that satis…es the axioms of the EU model, who exhibits weak aversion with a concave utility function given by u(x) = p x. One can check that for this decision maker Q Â P, that is, the expected utility of the lottery P, which has the smallest variance, is lower than the expected utility of Q. Thus, in the EU model , a risk averse decision maker might prefer a random variable with higher variance (holding means constant).
Note however that when u(x) is a second order polynomial (as in the capital asset pricing model-CAPM), a risk averse decision maker will always prefer among two random variables with the same mean, the one with the lowest variance. One can actually show that with such a utility function, the expected utility of a distribution depends only on its means and its variance.
The EU model is widely used in economics. It has nice properties that make it very tractable. In particular, in a dynamic setting, it is compatible with dynamic programming and backward induction.
However, it has also been criticized on a number of di¤erent grounds.
Some problems raised by the EU model
We analyze here a few problems raised by the EU model. 7 .
7 For a review see Machina (1987) . 16 
Allais paradox
As early as 1953, Allais built a couple of alternatives for which a majority of subjects, confronted with that choice, decided in contradiction with the independence axiom. We present here the original Allais experiment. Subjects were confronted with the choice between the following lotteries (say in euros):
win 1M with certainty L 2 : win 1M with probability 0.89, 5M with probability 0.10, and 0 with probability 0.01 and then with the choice among the following two lotteries: L 0 1 : win 1M with probability 0.11 and 0with probability 0.89 L 0 2 : win 5M with probability 0.10 and 0 with probability 0.90 Most subjects chose L 1 over L 2 , and L 0 2 over L 0 1 . This choice violates the independence axiom. Indeed, let P be the lottery yielding 1 M with probability 1 and Q the lottery yielding 0 with probability 1=11 and 5 M with probability 10=11. One can check that:
where ± 0 is the lottery "win 0 with probability 1" and ± 1 is the lottery "win 1 M with probability 1 ". The observed choice are thus in contradiction with the independence axiom.
This experiment has been ran many times, on various population of subjects with similar results: about 66% of the choices are in contradiction with the independence axiom.
These results have led researchers to acknowledge some descriptive de…cien-cies of the EU model. But most of them remain convinced that the normative aspect of the model should be given more weight.
Interpreting the utility function
On top of experimental violations of the independence axiom, the expected utility model raises a theoretical issue concerning the interpretation of the utility function u. This function captures at the same time two rather distinct behavioral features: (i) it captures the decision maker's risk attitude (concavity of u implies that the decision maker is risk averse, (ii) it captures the decision maker's attitude toward certain outcomes (concavity of u implies a decreasing marginal utility of wealth, say). It is thus impossible to represent in this model a decision maker that would be risk seeking and would have a decreasing marginal utility.
The EU model being so parsimonious cannot separate risk attitudes from attitudes toward wealth under certainty. This disctinction is possible in more ‡exible but less parsimonious models that will be presented in chapter 3.
Weak and strong risk aversion under expected utility
As stated in remark 6, weak and strong risk aversions cannot be distinguished in the expected utility model. 
Problems with the notion of second order stochastic dominance as an indicator of riskiness in the EU model
Despite the fact that second order stochastic dominance has a nice characterization in the EU model, this notion can lead to some counter-intuitive results. We will focus on two of them. First, in the classical portfolio choice problem where the decision maker has the choice between any mixture of a risky asset and a riskless asset, a natural prediction would be that if the risky asset becomes riskier in the sense of MPS, then any risk averse investor should reduce his position in this asset. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971) have shown that this is not always the case in the expected utility model. The second issue deals with insurance choices. A decision maker that is more risk averse than another is not necessarily ready to pay at least as much as the second one to get the same risk reduction (in the sense of MPS), see for instance Ross, 1981 ).
Some alternative models
There exist severak decision models under risk that, to …t better the observed behavior, weaken one or several of the vNM axioms. We brie ‡y expose a few of them. A review of these models and the experimental evidence around them is in Harless et Camerer (1994).
Machina's model
In the model in Machina (1982) , the independence axiom is dropped while weak order and continuity are retained. Still, the functional used to represent preferences is smooth (i.e., Fréchet di¤erentiable). As a consequence, this model is locally very similar to the EU model since locally, the functional can be approximated by a linear functional.
Models with security and potential levels
Several experiments have shown that violations of the EU model disappear when the distributions compared have the same maximum and the same minimum. Ja¤ray (1988), Gilboa (1988) , Cohen (1992) and Essid (1997) have axiomatized a model in which the independence axiom is satis…ed only for distributions with the same minimum (Ja¤ray, 1988 , Gilboa 1988 or same minimum and maximum (Cohen, 1992 , Essid, 1997 . This is a rather weak condition. One thus needs to add, on top of weak order and continuity some other axioms. The representation takes the form of the combination of three criteria: the Minimum, the Maximum and the expected utility. This model is compatible with many experiments that have shown that the iso-utility curves are parallel (as in the EU model) when the distributions have the same extremal points, while they move away from parallel lines when extrema are di¤erent.
Other models exist in the literature (see Harless et Camerer (1994) . Probably the most well-known compatible with Allais' experiment is the Rank Dependent Expected Utility Model (Quiggin (1982) ), based on the Choquet integral and that will be presented in some detain in chapter 3.
